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Va. Code § 64-38.1 (1950), enacted
in 1956, gives a widow whose dower
cannot be conveniently assigned in
kind a right to have her dower com-
muted to a gross sum against the
wishes of the heirs. This means-
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It is settled law in this state that a widow whose dower has
not been assigned is not a competent party plaintiff in a
partition suit. She has no estate in the land until her dower
is assigned and therefore is not a joint tenant, a tenant in
common, or a coparcener with her husband's heirs. White v.
White, 16 Gratt. (57 Va.) 264, 268 (1861). Until recently, it
was equally well settled that, except under anomalous circum-
stances, neither the holder of a life estate nor the other parties
in interest could obtain, over the objection of the other, a
commutation of the interest of the holder of the life estate to
a gross sum. The consent of both was required. Wilson v.
Davisson, 2 Rob. (41 Va.) 403, 422 (1843) ; Blair v. Thompson,
11 Gratt. (52 Va.) 441, 452 (1854); White v. White, supra;
Davis v. Davis, 25 Gratt. (66 Va.) 587, 598 (1874); Simmons
v. Lyles, 27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 922, 930 (1876) ; Wilson v. Branch,
77 Va. 65 (1883) ; Slater v. Slater, 124 Va. 370 (1919) ; Powers
v. Sutherland, 157 Va. 336, 343 (1931); Phlegar's Exr. v.
Smith, 131 Va. 268 (1921). For the "anomalous circum-
stances" see American Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 112 Va. 1 (1911).
Va. Code Ann. § 55-277 (1950), enacted in 1926, allows com-
mutation to a gross sum where the cost of investing the share
of the holder of the life estate exceeds 5 per cent of the gross
annual income from that share; Va. Code Ann. § 64-46 (1950)
gives remaindermen the option of paying a gross sum where
a creditor is seeking to subject dower or curtesy to the satis-
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faction of his lien. Because of the limited application of these
statutes they will be ignored during the balance of this dis-
cussion.
Va. Code Ann. § 64-38.1 (1950), enacted in 1956, calls for a
re-examination of these rules.
The cited Code section provides that a widow whose dower
has not been assigned, and whose dower cannot be convenient-
ly laid off in kind, may petition the court to have her dower
commuted to a gross sum calculated according to the tables
found in sections 55-269 to 277 of the Code. Section 64-38.1
further provides:
[T]he court may, in its discretion, either require the heirs
at law to pay to such widow a gross sum in lieu of dower
... or may, if such heirs fail or refuse to make such pay-
ment, have such real property sold. From the [net?]
proceeds of such sale there shall be paid, first, the gross
sum equivalent of the widow's dower interest; the re-
mainder of such proceeds shall be paid to the heirs at
law, pro rata, according to their interest in such real
property.
The widow whose dower has not been assigned has become
a competent party plaintiff, in her own right, to institute a
proceeding which, in effect, could result in partition or a "sale
of lands of persons under disabilities." The statute appears to
be a boon to the widow whose husband died intestate leaving
behind his widow, heirs (all of whom are infants), little or no
personalty, and an interest in some realty. It is suggested that
a widow in such circumstances, by utilizing section 64-38.1, can
more often realize some cash from her dower interest and can
obtain this cash quicker than if she attempted, as guardian on
behalf of the infants, to bring about a sale of lands of persons
under disabilities; a compliance with the strict procedural re-
quirements of a suit for the sale of lands of persons under dis-
abilities should not be necessary; however, as will be men-
tioned below, inquiries similar to, but yet different from, those
made in a suit for the sale of lands of persons under disabili-
ties should be made before entry of a decree allowing commu-
tation against persons under disabilities.
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When the personal assets of an estate are insufficient to pay
the debts, an imaginative practitioner might consider using a
proceeding under the statute as a substitute for a creditor's
suit.
There is little likelihood of conflict between the operation of
the statute and the rule that partition by sale cannot be had if
it is convenient to partition the property in kind. Va. Code
Ann. § 8-692 (1950) ; Cauthornv. Cauthorn, 196 Va. 614 (1955).
It would seem that if it were convenient to partition the prop-
erty in kind then dower could be conveniently laid off in kind
and, in such event, the statute could not be utilized.
The Discretionary Language of the Statute is Troublesome.
The language of the statute giving the court discretion is
susceptible of at least two interpretations. The first is that the
court has no discretion whatsoever as to whether to commute
dower when it is not convenient to assign it in kind, but dis-
cretion merely to decide whether (1) to cause the heirs to pay
or (2) to order the land to be sold.
The second, and more reasonable, interpretation is that the
discretion of the court relates to whether commutation to a
gross sum is to be allowed. This interpretation is believed by
the writer to be the more reasonable one because the statute
itself contains unmistakable directions as to when the land
should be sold (hence there is no need for the court to exercise
its discretion relative to that issue); and the first interpre-
tation, among other things, would enable a widow with an ab-
breviated life expectancy-due to an incurable, fatal disease,
for example-to have her interest in the land computed on the
basis of normal life expectancy. Such a drastic change in
the dower interest should be occasioned, if at all, by clearer
language than that found in section 64-38.1. The statute should
be re-drafted so as to make clear the direction in which the
judge's discretion can be exercised.
Assuming judicial or legislative adoption of the second in-
terpretation, what factor or factors should a trial judge take
into account in deciding whether to allow commutation? Three
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distinct groups of factual situations suggest themselves:
First, when the evidence shows that the life expectancy of
the widow is materially less than normal, it is submitted that
a commutation should not be allowed.
Second, in cases in which the life expectancy of the widow
is not in issue, but the rights of incompetents are involved, it
is submitted that the court should engage in a balancing
process: On the one hand, it should consider the financial
needs of the widow and the advantages to her of allowing
commutation; on the other hand, the disadvantages to the in-
competent heirs (or devisees) of making sale of the property.
It is impracticable to discuss the myriad situations which
could arise; discussion of two possible situations will illus-
trate the balancing process: A young widow wealthy in her
own right, is seeking commutation against her infant children;
the evidence discloses that the children have no funds with
which to pay the widow the value of her commuted dower and
that a sale of the realty would not be advantageous to the chil-
dren; commutation should not be allowed. However, if the
widow was in financial need and all other facts remained the
same, commutation should be allowed. If the factors on each
side appear to be in balance, the commutation should be
allowed.
Third, when a widow seeks commutation against remainder-
men all of whom are sui juris, and the widow's life expectancy
is not in issue, the commutation should be allowed, absent
some circumstances which would shock the conscience of the
court; for example, a severely (but temporarily) depressed
real estate market which would render it difficult both to de-
termine the value of the realty and to make sale of it at a fair
price.
It should be noticed that neither the consent, as such, of the
heirs nor the remainderman's chance of surviving the widow
is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether
to allow the commutation; consideration of either, or both, of
these factors would dilute the right apparently intended to be
given the widow by the statute.
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In any event, once the court has decided to commute dower
to a gross sum, consistency with partition proceedings, as well
as the statute, seems to demand that the court not order the
land sold if the heirs are willing and able to pay. Consistency
with partition proceedings would likewise demand that any
one or more of the heirs be given an opportunity to buy the
land before it is offered for sale to third parties.
A show cause order (fixing a reasonable time within which
the heirs are to pay or themselves buy the land or allow the
land to be sold to some third party) could be used to good
advantage at this stage of the proceedings.
Although dower is a legal interest and can be assigned by a
proceeding at law, it is reasonable to assume that the legis-
lative intent was that the proceeding under the statute be com-
menced on the equity side of the court; the use of the word
"petition" in the statute points to this conclusion, as does
the fact that commuting dower or commuting dower and sell-
ing realty are the kinds of business usually done on the equity
side.
Funds No Longer Tied up in Court.
Before the enactment of section 64-38.1, where dower could
not be assigned in kind, if the heirs refused to consent to a
commutation of a widow's dower interest to a gross sum, the
widow's share of the net proceeds from a sale was invested
under the supervision of the court and the income therefrom
paid to her during her life. Upon her death the corpus was dis-
tributed to the remaindermen. Wilson v. Davisson, 2 Rob. (41
Va.) 403, 422 (1843); Harrison v. Payne, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.)
387 (1879) ; American Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 112 Va. 1 (1911) ;
Slater v. Slater, 124 Va. 370, 375 (1919) ; Phlegar v. Smith, 131
Va. 268 (1921). The disadvantages of this method were the
scrimpy returns received on the court-invested corpus and
what was, in essence, a drawn-out administration of the "es-
tate," with those entitled to the remainder having to await the
death of the widow before realizing upon one-third or the
whole of their inheritance. (The 1956 amendment to section
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64-1, placing the widow in the second class of inheritance, has
the following result: Under Va. Code Ann. § 64-27 (1950), a
widow's dower is always at least a life interest in one-third of
her husband's realty, but it is a life interest in the whole if he
died intestate "without issue." Since it was held in Munda.y
v. Munday, 164 Va. 145 (1935), that an adopted child is not
"issue," before the amendment of section 64-1 if the husband
left adopted children but no natural children, section 64-27
worked to the detriment of his parents or his brothers and sis-
ters, as well as his adopted children, but under the amended
statute the parents or brothers and sisters would inherit no
interest in the realty and section 64-27 would deprive them of
nothing. Section 64-27, therefore, now serves only to discrim-
inate against adopted children. This discrimination is prob-
ably due to an oversight, and section 64-27 should be amended
to read "children" instead of "issue.")
Offset against the advantage section 64-38.1 has of remov-
ing the widow's share from court supervision during her life-
time are the loss of relative security which allegedly naive and
gullible widows have in court-invested funds, and the me-
chanical way in which the mortality tables apportion the in-
terests of the widow and heirs with only statistical consider-
ation of the possibility of an early demise on the part of the
widow.
Leaving aside respect for maternal wishes and tax consid-
erations, the chances are that heirs would prefer to gamble on
the early death of a comparatively young widow and refuse to
consent to commutation of her dower to a gross sum; under
section 64-38.1 the widow under appropriate circumstances
has a clear right to commutation even against the wishes of
the heirs, and if she dies after the decree commuting her
dower is entered the sum ordered paid to her is part of her
estate. Dower has been enlarged and the rights of the heirs
have been diminished by section 64-38.1.
In most situations that actually arise under. the statute, any
"hardship" on the heirs will be apparent only: The young
widow whose commuted dower siphons off a large portion of
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the proceeds of a sale may die shortly after the commutation
of her dower; but, in all such instances her husband died with
either children or grandchildren, or both, surviving him (if
he had not, the widow would have taken the fee-Section 64-1,
as amended) and in most families the widow will see to it that
the sum she received for her dower interest is willed to the
children (or grandchildren) or it will pass to them under the
intestacy laws. Stepmothers might prove to be an exception.
Does a Renowncing Widow Have a Right to Commutation?
A widow who has renounced the will of her husband, or a
widow for whom no provision has been made in her husband's
will, is entitled to claim dower. Does she have a right to com-
mutation to a gross sum under section 64-38.1? Although the
statute speaks only of compelling the "heirs at law" (as dis-
tinguished from devises) to pay the widow, this alone should
not be taken to mean that the statute cannot be used by a re-
nouncina widow against the devisees. The first sentence of
section 64-38.1 places no limitation on the right to commuta-
tion other than the prerequisite that the petitioner's dower
cannot be conveniently laid off in kind.
Although there are plausible arguments which could be ad-
vanced against allowing a widow to use the statute against
devisees, it is likely that the failure of the legislature to make
express provision for its use against devisees was an over-
sight. It is recommended that the statute be amended so as to
clarify its applicability as against devisees by a widow who
has renounced the will of her husband. Allowing the re-
nouncing widow a right to commute as against the devisees
would be in harmony with the trend toward enlarging the
rights of a surviving spouse in the property of the deceased
spouse.
The same observations are pertinent as regards the right
of a widow to claim a right to commutation against creditors
of her husband's estate.
Can tAe Widow's Petition be Filed in a Pending Suit?
To obtain commutation without the consent of the heirs,
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does a widow have to institute proceedings as a plaintiff or
may she file her petition in a pending suit such as a suit for
partition, a suit for the sale of lands of persons under dis-
abilities, or any other suit wherein the claim would be ger-
mane ?
It would seem that a widow should be permitted to file her
petition in a pending suit. Otherwise her substantive rights
under section 64-38.1 might depend upon a race to the Clerk's
Office to institute proceedings, or the bringing of an independ-
ent proceeding by her which, in any event, should be heard
together with any other pending suit relative to the same sub-
ject matter; either alternative would be out of keeping with
modern concepts of procedure.
There seems to be no good reason why the widow's
"petition" could not be set out by way of petition or cross-
bill in any proceeding wherein the matter of commutation
might properly come before the court.
Who Can. Act for an Incompetent WidowP
An election by the widow to make use of section 64-38.1 in-
dicates that she has "consented" to a commutation of her
dower to a gross sum. If the widow is incompetent, by reason
of infancy or because non compos mentis, who is capable of
filing the petition on her behalf, i.e., giving "consent" for
her ?
Va. Code Ann. § 55-276 (1950) provides that where any of
the parties interested in a commutation are under disability,
the court may, upon application of the guardian, committee,
or trustee, and if none, upon application of a guardian ad
litem appointed by the court, after hearing evidence satis-
factory to the court, enter an order authorizing the named
persons to consent to the commutation on behalf of the incom-
petent. Compliance with this statute has been held to be in-
dispensable to the effective commutation of curtesy. Powers
v. Sutherland, 157 Va. 336 (1931).
The application of section 55-276 to a proceeding brought
under section 64-38.1 could produce a rather unique pro-
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cedural situation: An infant widow for whom no guardian
had been appointed could presumably institute proceedings
by next friend and name the heirs as defendants. The court
would be required to appoint a guardian ad litem for the in-
fant widow-a plaintiff-for the purpose of consenting to
commutation. The court would also appoint a guardian ad
Zitem for the infant defendants, if such there be. It should be
noted, however, that the appointment of the guardian ad lit em
for the infant defendants would be for the purpose of giving
the court jurisdiction over them and not for the purpose of
consenting to commutation; strictly speaking, the consent of
the heirs is not necessary to a commutation under section
64-38.1.
Estate Taxes: Commutation and the Marital Deduction.
Before the enactment of section 64-38.1, dower in Virginia
could be looked upon as only a life estate in realty. It did not
qualify for the marital deduction under the federal estate tax
laws because it was a "terminable interest." Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 2-56(b) (1).
The enactment of section 64-38.1 calls for a reconsideration
in Virginia of the eligibility of "dower" for the marital de-
duction. Authority is scarce. U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(b)
(2) (iii) provides "that the dower or curtesy interest (or
statutory interest in lieu thereof) of the decendent's surviving
spouse is considered as having passed from the decedent to
such spouse." This regulation is favorable to the widow be-
cause it recognizes that the dower interest meets the require-
ment that property in which the marital deduction is claimed
pass from the decedent to the surviving spouse.
In regard to "the terminable interest" rule and dower, in
Rev. Rul. 279, 1953 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 25, at 34, it is stated
that where under local law the widow's dower, interest con-
sisted of a life estate in one-third of decedent's realty and
that interest was thereafter commuted to a gross sum under
a state statute allowing the personal representative, with the
widow's consent, to sell the land and pay the widow a gross
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sum for her dower interest, the sum received by the widow
would not qualify for the marital deduction. It was reasoned
therein that the sum received by the widow did not qualify
because it stemmed from the life interest received under state
law and was a terminable interest; that the sum received by
the widow was not a statutory interest in lieu of dower and
could not be regarded as separate and distinct from the basic
dower interest to which the widow was entitled.
However, in Crosby v. United States, 148 F. Supp. 810
(N.D. Fla. 1957), it was held that where under an Alabama
statute a personal representative was permitted to sell a
decedent's land for the payment of debts and the widow by
consenting to such sale could have her dower (life estate in
one-third) sold and the proceeds paid to her in a lump sum,
the amount paid the widow for her dower interest qualified
for the marital deduction.
Both the Revenue Ruling and the above-cited case are ad-
dressed to factual situations in which state statutes empowered
the personal representative to make the initial decision to
institute proceedings leading to commutation. Because section
64-38.1 is believed to give the widow, in appropriate circum-
stances, an absolute right both to initiate the proceedings and
to obtain commutation of her dower to a gross sum, and as
these rights accrue immediately upon, and because of, the
husband's death, it could be argued that dower (where the
requirements of section 64-38.1 are met) should no longer be
classed as merely a life estate in realty, but also in the nature
of a vested and absolute right to acquire full ownership of
personalty. Thus it could be argued that the widow's interest
under section 64-38.1, if thereafter commuted to a gross sum,
is in the nature of a statutory interest in lieu of dower which
passed to the widow upon the death of the decedent, is not a
terminable interest, and qualifies for the marital deduction.
Not Applicable to Curtesy.
Section 64-38.1 does not appear to be applicable to a hus-
band's curtesy.
